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Non-rifOulement is the central part of the protection of the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees. It is true that Article 1, a definition, is the passport to Convention
refugee status and the expectation ofnaturalization. However, this affects only a fraction of
the world's refugees. Non-rifOulement, and the form of protection it brings, affects 10-15
million refugees.
Although it is now recognized that non-rifOulement has been reinforced by other human
rights treaties, such as the Convention against Torture, (CAT), the full impact has not been
grasped. Non-discrimination obligations from Article 26 of the 1966 Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, (CCPR) can limit differentiations in the allocating of rights and
benefits.
A review ofrights based refuge is timely because the content, what is enjoyed beyond the
refuge itself, is highly variable and relates, in part, to ambiguities in key terms allocating
rights in the Convention. However, the refugees involved may be persons protected from
expulsion not only by the Convention, but also by the newer human rights treaties. So the
content problems also relate to a lack of interpretation of human rights treaties as these
apply to persons protected from expulsion.
Throughout, this essay shows that authoritative interpretation of treaties is needed to
make the promise of the rights based refuge a reality for refugees.
1. Introduction
There is a need to look again at non-rtifOulement. An opinion on the principle
of non-rtifOulement was one topic among nine rather than the central
theme of the 2001 Global Consultations of the UNHCR. 1 The impact
of human rights treaties on non-rtifOulement can only grow. It is time to
begin to replace academic opinions with authoritative treaty
interpretation.
Non-rtifOulement is the central part of the protection of the 1951
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.2 It is true that Article 1,
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2 Guy Goodwin-Gill, 'The Refugee in International Law', 2nd Edition, Oxford: New York 1996,
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a definition, is the passport to Convention refugee status and the expecta-
tion of naturalization. However, this affects only a fraction of the world's
refugees.3 Non-rifoulement, and the form of protection it brings, affects
10-15 million refugees.4 It deserves revisiting.
Although it is now recognized that non-rifoulement has been reinforced by
other human rights treaties, such as the Convention against Torture,
(CAT), the full impact has not been grasped. Non-discrimination obliga-
tions from Article 26 of the 1969 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
(CCPR) can limit differentiations in the allocating of rights and benefits.
This article calls into question the differentiations originally provided in
the text of the 1951 Convention.5 This is because treaties are to be
interpreted in their current juridical context, which includes the body of
subsequent rights and benefits and related jurisprudence.6 As a conse-
quence, non-rifoulement must now be viewed as part ofa wider "rights based
refuge". What is the significance and potential of rights based refuge as
human rights treaties become increasingly important? Who is affected?
How do they benefit? How might they benefit?
There are other reasons that make the examination of rights based
refuge timely. Governments on the Standing Committee of the Executive
Committee of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees' program have
identified certain protection needs: 'temporary protection' in mass exo-
duses;7 and 'complementary protection' for individuals.8 The Standing
Committee described these as matters for State discretion. Yet it can be
argued that these persons may claim such protection as 'rights based
protection'. The protection of persons in mass influxes and the role of
temporary protection were raised during UNHCR's Global Consultations
in 2001, but without any significant advances.9
A review of rights based refuge is timely because the content, what is
enjoyed beyond the refuge itself, is highly variable and relates, in part, to
3 1951 Convention, Art. 34 requires' ... States shall as far as possible facilitate the assimilation and
naturalization of refugees .. .'.
4 Unless stated otherwise 'refugees' means persons qualifYing under the Mandate of UNHCR as
extended by direction of the General Assembly, all as provided in the 1950 Statute of the UNHCR.
5 Tom Clark with Francois Crepeau, 'Mainstreaming Refugee Rights. The 1951 Refugee Con-
vention and International Human Rights Law', 17 Netherlands Qyarterly qf Human Rights 389
(1999).
6 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is the standard for treaty interpretation. Article
31 requires using the ordinary meaning ofthe text in context of the whole treaty and using the juridical
context ofsubsequent agreements such as human rights treaties. See Clark with Crepeau (1999), above
n. 5 at 391 and 393.
7 Standing Committee, Progress Report on Informal Consultations on the Provision qfInternational Protection to
All Who Need It, UN Doe. ECI47ISC/CRP.27, 30 May 1997 at Section n, Paras. 4-5 (called Standing
Committee 1997).
8 Standing Committee, Complementary Forms qf Protection: Their Nature and Relationship to the
International RifUgee Protection Regime, UN Doe. EC/50/CRP.18, 9 June 2000 (called Standing
Committee 2000).
9 See Chairman's Summary, Global Consultations, Protection of Refugees in Situations of Mass
Influx, 8-9 Mar. 2001.
ambiguities in key terms allocating rights in the Convention. However, the
refugees involved may be persons protected from expulsion not only by the
Convention, but also by the newer human rights treaties. So the content
problems also relate to a lack of interpretation of human rights treaties as
these apply to persons protected from expulsion.
Throughout, this essay shows that authoritative interpretation oftreaties
is needed to make the promise of the rights based refu~e a reality for
refugees. Although UNHCR can supervise its application, 0 only the IC]
can offer an authoritative global interpretation of the 1951 Convention
together with the various newer human rights treaties. 11 However, UN
human rights treaty committees can offer authoritative interpretations of
at least the many applications of human rights treaties to rights based
refuge. Existing treaty bodies, for example the UN Human Rights Com-
mittee (HRC) acting under the CCPR, could provide a parallel line of
protection drawing on CCPR rights available to everyone. The CCPR
Article 26 right to non-discrimination is ofparticular signficance. It applies
to all situations in which a right or benefit is allocated so that the HRC
interpretation of CCPR Article 26 applies to rights offered by the 1951
Convention. The 1951 Convention permits distinctions among categories
of refugees in their enjoyment of rights under the 1951 Convention. In
these ways the HRC can reinforce aspects of the Convention. 12 Although
there is some potential for other authoritative international interpretation
of rights based refuge related to the 1951 Convention in its new human
rights context, a treaty committee with authority to interpret the 1951
Convention could make a useful contribution alongside the existing UN
human rights treaty committees, facilitating joint or common interpreta-
tions of the various treaties relevant for refugee situations.
In concluding, this essay endorses a move from State discretion towards
temporary protection that follows parallel human rights treaty obligations
and obligations under customary law. 13 The basis for a wider rights-based
protection for refugees is already largely in place.
2. Rights Based Refuge, Temporary and
Complementary Protection
2.1 Refuge Versus Asylunt
There has been a confusion between asylum and rights based refuge.
An international perspective on the right to asylum assigns it three
to 1951 Convention, Art. 35.
11 The context for interpretation is that of a dispute among State Parties which cannot be resolved
by other means. 1951 Convention, Art. 38.
12 C1ark with Crepeau (1999), above n. 5 at 393.
13 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, above n. 1, at 149-163.
elements: ri~ht of entry; protection from forced return; and rights while
remaining. 1 There is no global treaty right to asylum. The grant of
asylum remains a discretionary act by a State. 15 A world conference
aimed at adopting a treaty on territorial asylum based on the UN Declara-
tion on Territorial Asylum collapsed in 1977. 16
The 1951 Convention, on the other hand, promises protection from
forcible return and rights while present or staying. It does not promise a
right of entry. A right to asylum comes from other human rights treaties
because any right of entry presently comes from these treaties. 17 Govern-
ments were evidently unwilling to grant a clear right ofentry which would
have completed a full right of asylum. The lack of a right of entry, that is,
the lack of a right to arrive in a place of refuge, brings major problems
which this essay will not explore. However, if the person can enter a State
party to the 1951 Convention, Article 31 provides that an illegal means of
arrival will not result in penalties. IS Article 33 refuge - non-rtifOulement-
is as far towards a right to asylum as governments went when they adopted
the 1951 Convention. The Convention offers protection from return,
rights while remaining, and an alternative to a right of entry - the
overlooking of illegal entry. The combination of Article 33 with the
other relevant articles of the Convention is a form of rights based refuge.
It is rights based because it can be asserted by an individual against a State
party even when it is inconvenient, but only through domestic tribunals.
Whether one can go beyond 'entry overlooked' to a right of admission
depends on the impact of the human rights treaties, discussed below, and
on the legal significance of the 'Conclusions' of the Executive Committee
of the UNHCR (EXCOM). The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties is the standard for treaty interpretation. Article 31 requires
using the ordinary meaning of the text in context of the whole treaty
including its purpose. It also requires using the juridical context of sub-
sequent agreements by States Parties relating to the interpretation of the
treaty. 19 Since the 1951 Convention text was adopted, certain States have
reached some less formal agreements. In particular, Conclusion No 22 of
14 For example, see C.L.C. Mubanga-Chipoya, Final Report, The Right qf Everyone to Leave
atry Country, Including His Own, and to Retum to His Country, UN Doe. E/C.4/Sub.2!l988/35,
June 1988, 103-106.
15 Goodwin Gill, above n. 2, at 172-174.
16 Ibid., at 175 and 181.
17 General Comment 15 of the UN Human Rights Committee hints that non-discrimination and
family rights may provide a right of entry. They would stem from single or combinations ofCovenant
on Civil and Political Rights Arts. 17,23,24 and 26. Convention on the Rights ofthe Child Arts. 9 and
10 complement such CCPR rights. Thus a spouse and child of an asylum seeker likely have a right of
entry to the State once the asylum seeker has claimed refugee status from the authorities.
18 It is inappropriate to blame refugees for using the arrangements provided to seek and enjoy
aSy'lum - illegal arrival.
19 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331. See Lauterpacht and
Bethlehem, above n. 1, at para. 40.
the Executive Committee of the UNHCR's program is about protecting
asylum seekers in large scale influxes.2o Conclusion 22 requires the State
where the refugees first seek refuge to always 'admit' refugees, at least on a
temporary basis. The EXCOM is a distinct body of the UN and its
Conclusions have interpretive value for the 1951 Convention.21 This
interpretive value is reinforced when the Conclusion refers directly to an
aspect of the 1951 Convention, as in the case of Conclusion No. 22. An
EXCOM report with the Conclusions may be the object of one or more
subsequent Resolutions of the General Assembly. In some judgements, the
IC] has considered resolutions of the General Assembly as persuasive.
Authoritative interpretation would likely find that a large scale influx
presenting to border officials at a land border where the State has jurisdic-
tion must be admitted for Article 33 refuge. The issue oflimits is discussed
later, below.
2.2 Non-refoule1nent - Article 33 Refuge
The 1951 Convention can be viewed as consisting ofthree parts: (1) Article
33 refuge or non-rqaulement; (2) rights and obligations while in fact
present or remaining; and (3) a Convention refugee definition, Article 1.
This essay considers Article 33 non-rqaulement and related rights as
expanded by human rights from other treaties States have often also
ratified.
It is by now established that if a refugee can find a way to arrive within
State territory, Article 33 of the Convention prohibits returning any
'refugee' in any manner whatsoever to a country where their life or free-
dom would be threatened.22 This 'non-rqaulement' is not absolute. 23 Its
effect in the Convention text is to allow refuge which is temporary pending
the adjudication ofstatus of individuals or ofgroups who may be refugees.
The person's refugee status is recognized by the State applying the
Convention definition. The term 'refugee' used in the text of the 1951
Convention includes those claiming refugee status - asylum seekers.
Persons without documents specified in domestic law, undocumented
20 Conclusion No. 22 (XXXII), 1 981, Goodwin-Gill 1996, above n. 2, at 480-483.
21 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem, above n. 1, at paras. 28 and 29.
22 Art. 33 (1) No Contracting State shall expel or return 'rqiJule' a refugee in any manner
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where her life or freedom would be threatened on account
of her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. (2) The
benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable
grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which she is, or who, having been
convicted by a final judgement ofa particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of
that country.
23 The references to crime, danger and national security in Arts. 33 and 32 link to concerns also
present in exclusion clause l(F) which prevents persons who have committed war crimes, crimes
against humanity and serious non political crimes from obtaining protection (here - refuge). Geoff
Gilbert, 'Current Issues in the Application of the Exclusion Clauses', in Feller, Turk and Nicholson
above, n. 1, at 425.
persons seeking refuge, are not excluded from the term 'refugees' because
the Convention provides that these 'refugees' be given administrative
assistance and documentation.24 A person must be considered a Conven-
tion refu~ee at least until that person is found not to be a Convention
refugee.2
Even without Conclusion No. 22, mass exoduses from civil conflict
should benefit from Article 33 refuge if they arrive on State territory.
Like any plausible asylum seeker, they qualifY for protection at least until
determined not to be Convention refugees. Populations fleeing civil con-
flicts often include numbers of Convention refugees so that there is a
reasonable presumption that a person claiming to be a refugee may be
found to be one. Thus EXCOM Conclusion No 22 confirms the applica-
tion of the Convention Articles 33 and 31 for a large scale influx, at least
on a temporary basis.
What about individual asylum seekers? EXCOM Conclusions making
references to country of first arrival (No. 22) and to determining the
country with responsibility (No. 15) introduce ambiguities, but do not
remove the offer of refuge to individuals from civil conflicts. State practices
allowing some persons from serious conflicts to remain with or without
some alternative status are compatible with this interpretation.26 Thus,
Article 33 refuge should protect refugees in massive exoduses from civil
conflict as well as protecting some individual refugees who do not qualify
for formal Convention refugee status. For this to become internationally
consistent, States would need more international guidance on how to
establish a person as qualifying for mandate status and when temporary
refuge ends so that individual repatriation might be contemplated.
The correct interpretation of all these terms has become important
because States have put in place measures for the management of migra-
tion and the implementation of the 1951 Convention.27 These measures
could be viewed as forms of burden sharing or even burden passing, but
they are based on the notion that a State can be designated as 'safe' for
return in the full range of circumstances which individuals present.
Considering only the 1951 Convention, the possibility of finding
another country should be interpreted so as to mean another country
24 See Convention Arts. 25 and 27.
25 The UNHCR has allowed that 'manifestly or fraudulent' claims to refugee status can be dealt
with in an expeditious manner because they do not merit 'full evaluation at every level of the
procedure', but the general principle remains. See Conclusion No. 30 (XXXIV), 1983, para. (d).
26 For example Temporary Protected Status (US), B status (Netherlands), tolerated (Germany),
resident status on humanitarian and compassionate grounds (Canada), or persons on a list ofcountries
to which there is no deportation (Canada).
27 For example, Council Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003 of 18 Feb. 2003 establishing the criteria
and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application
lodged in one of the Member States by a third country national, Official Joumal if the EU, L050, 25
Feb. 2003, at 1-10.
which can be relied upon to formally apply all the relevant protections of
the 1951 Convention to the person or persons. Otherwise, it would be
contrary to the evident intent and purpose of the Convention regarding
non-rifOulement. Automatic return would also be contrary to the protection
of fundamental UN treaty rights. According to the limited case law of
the human rights treaty bodies, the State which exposes a person to a
foreseeable real risk of the violation of a fundamental right by expulsion is
itself held to have violated the person's right. Once an individual claims
rights based refuge under obligations from the 1951 Convention, the
person is lawfully present and the State should ensure the related rights
in all the circumstances which the individual presents.28
In contrast, present asylum-seeker transfer agreements to supposedly
safe third countries or home countries are based on the presumption that
the State in question will honour fundamental human rights obligations in
any circumstances presented by an individual. Any transfer of a person
claiming rights based refuge from the jurisdiction of one State to the
jurisdiction of another State requires measures to ensure protection of
fundamental rights in the particular circumstances of the case. For the
Americas, there has been some authoritative interpretation on related
issues. Automatic return would not meet the due process concerns raised
by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in its Report on
Canada's refugee determination system, discussed further below. Else-
where, authoritative interpretation of treaty obligations is needed to estab-
lish these views.
Non refoulement - Article 33 refuge - is both massively affirmed by
States and at the same time honoured in the breach. Over the years UNHCR
has welcomed the affirmation and has been critical of these breaches, but
they continue. They include border turn backs when the person is on State
territory and return ofpersons coming from States deemed 'safe'.
2.3 Beyond the 1951 Convention to Rights Based Refuge
The interpretation of the 1951 Convention has become more nuanced
since the international human rights treaties came into force. Many States
have ratified both the 1951 Convention and the CCPR. As noted above,
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires that the 1951
Convention be interpreted on the basis of the ordinary meaning of the text
in the context of the whole treaty and using the juridical context of
subsequent agreements. Subsequent agreement includes the texts of the
other human rights treaties and the related jurisprudence.29 It is not widely
28 Tom Clark with Francois Crepeau, 'Human Rights in Asylum Sharing and Other Human
Transfer Agreements', 22 NQ,HR 217, (2004).
29 ' ... An international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the
entire legal system prevailing at the time of interpretation .. .', Legal Consequences ftr State qf
the Continued Presence qf South Afiica in Namibia (South West Afiica) Notwithstanding Securiry
appreciated that non-discrimination under the Covenant challenges the
1951 Convention in the many areas where it assigns rights on the
basis ofwhether a person is a 'refugee', a 'refugee lawfully in the territory'
or a 'refugee lawfully staying'. 30 Article 26 of the CCPR extends non-
discrimination beyond the CCPR to any right or benefit, thus including
those of the 1951 Convention. The related doctrine ofnon-discrimination
developed by treaty bodies in their jurisprudence applies when interpret-
ing any distinctions. To avoid breaching the Covenant, the general doc-
trine requires that any distinction be established in law, for a legitimate
purpose, necessary and proportionate. The HRC refers to a distinction
being 'objective and reasonable' given the rights of the CCPR.31
It is clear that the human rights treaties have provided a broader
non-rifoulement protection than is established by Article 33 of the 1951
Convention. Article 3 of the Convention against Torture is particularly
clear in frotecting a person from return to face a serious probability of
torture. 3 The CCPR has been interpreted in case law by the HRC as
protecting a non-citizen from forcible return when it is predictable that
aspects ofthe right to life would be violated or when cruel treatment would
1 33resu t.
With hindsight, it is more remarkable that the human rights treaty
bodies did not make an earlier connection between non-rifoulement and
the protection of CCPR rights - including the special due process
Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1971, at 16 para. 53; '... Treaties that
affect human rights cannot be applied in such a manner as to constitute a denial of human rights as
understood at the time of their application .. .', Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (HungaryISlovakia),
Judgment, ICJ Reports 1997, at 7 paras. 114; , . .. to determine the legal status of the American
Declaration it is appropriate to look to the inter-American system oftoday in the light of the evolution
it has undergone since the adoption of the Declaration, rather than to examine the normative value
and significance which that instrument was believed to have had in 1948', 'Interpretation if the
American Declaration ifthe Rights and Duties ifMan within the Framework ifArticle 64 ifthe American Convention
on Human Rights', Advisory Opinion OCIO/89, Inter-American Court ofHuman Rights, 14July 1989,
at para. 37; ' ... the Convention is a living instrument which ... must be interpreted in the light of
present day conditions', Tyler v. UK,Judgment, European Court ofHuman Rights, Series A, No. 26,
25 Apr. 1978, at Para. 31.
30 Clark with Crepeau (1999), above n. 5, at 393.
31 Tom Clark withJan Niessen, Equality Rights and Non-Citizens in Europe and America: The Promise, the
Practice and Some Remaining Issues, 14 NQHR 245, 1996, 251. See also Manfred Nowak, UN. Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, Kehl/StrasbourglArlington: N.P. Engel, 1993, 465-466,
473-474.
32 Mutombo v. Switzerland, Communication No. 13/l993, Views 27 Apr. 1994, UN Doc.
CAT/C/l2/D/13/l993, Elmi v. Australia, Communication No. 120/l998, Views 17 Nov. 1998,
UN Doc., Alan v. Switzerland, Communication No. 21/1995, Views 8 May 1996, UN Doc. CAT/CI
16/D/2l/1996, Ayas v. Switzerland, Communication No. 97/1997, Views 12 Nov. 1998, UN Doc.
CAT/C/2l/D/97/l997, Paez v.Sweden, Communication No. 39/l996, Views 28 Apr. 1997, UN
Doc. CATIC/l8/D/39/l996. For analysis see Brian Gorlick, The Convention and the Committee Against
Torture: A Complementary Protection Regimefir Rifugees, 11 IJRL 479 (1999).
33 Ng v. Canada, Communication No. 469/l991, Views 7Jan. 1994, UN Doc. CCPR/C/49/DI
46911991; Judge v. Canada, Communication No. 829/l998, Views 20 Oct. 2003, UN Doc. CCPRI
C178/D/829/1998.
safeguard for non-citizens - CCPR Article 13. In the ordinary meaning
of the words, CCPR rights to life and liberty are at issue whenever 1951
Convention non-rifOulement is at issue. The coming into force of the CAT
enabled some progress. The prevention ofreturn to torture under Article 3
of the CAT has influenced the interpretation of CCPR protection from
torture and cruel treatment or punishment under CCPR Article 7. This
has an enormous potential impact on what happens at the border. Despite
the slow development of human rights treaty case law, border practices
and the use of burden sharing mechanisms for assigning responsibility for
refugee status determination are being challenged.34 States must now
protect any person under their jurisdiction from expulsion when there is
as a foreseeable consequence a real risk of the violation of some funda-
mental or important rights or freedoms. 35 But some big questions remain.
The HRC has talked briefly about rights of entry for non-citizens in
General Comment 15.36 Does a right of entry apply to a person on a
border, under jurisdiction of a State official and facing an evident real risk
of torture? This was part of the Macedonian experience facing Kosovar
refugees in 1999. The HRC and the Committee against Torture could
give an authoritative interpretation of CCPR and CAT on the matter.
The European Convention on Human Rights has been interpreted by
the European Court of Human Rights as prohibiting the forced return of
non-citizens when torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment would result. 37 Although the situation is usually distinct from that of
an asylum seeker, international human rights law has also established
limits to the expulsion of non-citizens when separation of the core family
would result. 38 The Court was more restrictive in recognizing family rights
and children's rights in entry.39
34 Clark with Crepeau (2004), above n. 28, presents such a challenge.
35 The rights that have been at issue in expulsion or extradition are: the right to freedom of
movement; the right to seek and obtain asylum; the right to life; the right to protection from torture and
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; family rights and children's rights; and, the
right to an effective remedy and/or access to courts. See Clark with Crepeau (2004), above n. 28, at
222-225. See also Tom Clark and Sharryn Aiken with BarbaraJackman and David Matas, Intemational
Human Rights lAw and Legal Remedies in Expulsion: Progress and Some Remainingproblems with Special Riference to
Canada, 15 NQ.HR 429,435 (1997).
36 See above n. 17.
37 Soeringv. [J.K,Judgment 19Jan. 1989, Ser. AI61(1989), Chahalv. [J.K,Judgment 15 Nov. 1996,
Reports ofJudgments and Decisions I996-V (1996); Hilal v. [J.K,Judgment 6 Mar. 2001, Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 2001-II, (2001).
38 Early case law prohibited expulsion of even a very serious criminal see Moustaquim v. Belgium,
Judgment 18 Feb. 1991, Ser. AI93 (1991). Some dissenting judgments anticipated review ofcriteria in
Nasri v. France,Judgment 13July 1995, Ser. A320-B (1995). The Court pulled back, allowing expulsion
for very serious crime in Bouchelka v. France, Judgment 29 Jan. 1997, Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 1997-1 (1997). The Court continues to prohibit expulsion for quite serious crimes when
there is reasonable residence established in Radovanovic v. Austria,Judgment 22 Apr. 2004.
39 See Gill v. Switzerland, Judgment 19 Feb. 1996, Reports of judgments and Decisions 1996-1
(1996).
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has interpreted the
OAS Charter human rights obligations as they apply in refugee status
determination in Canada, emphasising due process concerns at various
stages. The Commission's interpretation would require access to the courts
to litigate violations of fundamental rights and high due process standards
for rights at issue in access and in expulsion situations.4o Gilbert reached a
related conclusion with respect to high due process standards in aspects of
1951 Convention non-rifoulement.41
A final impact of the human rights treaties is on the responsibility of the
UNHCR for supervising State application of the Convention. The sig-
nificance of UNHCR's advice is diminished by the fact that the 1951
Convention must now be applied in a context of parallel human rights
treaty protections that the UNHCR lacks the authority to interpret.
To indicate that the 1951 Convention no longer stands alone, I have
used the term 'rights based refuge' for the wider protection of 1951
Convention Article 33 refuge combined with related protection of the
human rights found in other treaties. Rights based refuge has the potential
to meet the need for additional protection, whether 'temporary protection'
or 'complementav protection', which governments and the UNHCR
have recognized.4 An authoritative interpretation, an Advisory Opinion
from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights or the International
Court of Justice would reinforce the decisions of the treaty bodies in
influencing State practice and encouraging corresponding legislative
change and national court decisions.
3. Content Rights
In addition to differences in accessing rights based refuge, the inconsistent
granting of rights to those possessing this status is a further problem.43
What happens once the rights based refuge has been secured matters. Can
these people work or get social assistance? Do they get essential medical
care? Can a child go to school? When can a spouse or child join them?
Human rights are not enjoyed as individual rights - they are enjoyed as a
40 'The American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man provides in Article XVIII that every
person has the right to resort to the courts to ensure respectfir [ ... ] legal rights, and to have access to a simple,
briifprocedure whereby the courts will protect him or her from acts ifauthority that '" violate any fUndamental
constitutional rights. The right of access is a necessary aspect of the right to resort to the courts set forth in
Article XVIII. The right of access to judicial protection to ensure respect for a legal right requires
available and effective recourse for the violation of a right protected under the Declaration or the
Constitution of the country concerned.' (Emphasis added). Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, Report on the Situation ifHuman Rights ifAsylum Seekers Within the Canadian Rifitgee Status Determination
o$ystem (2000), at para. 95. See also para. 98.
41 Gilbert, above n. 23, at 470-471.
42 Standing Committee 2000, above n. 8, at paras. 10-11 and 20~22.
43 See Standing Committee 1997, above n. 7, andJames C. Hathaway and John A. Dent, RifUgee
Rights: Report on a Comparative SUTVf[)I, Toronto: York Lanes Press, 1995.
complete package necessary for human dignity, security of the person and
a sense of well being. Rather like health, all the other human rights are
affected when even one right is not enjoyed. More specifically, uncertain
procedures and family separation give rise to worse symptoms of post
traumatic stress disorder among asylum seekers.44 A State concerned
about honouring human rights obligations should offer as much clarity
about the rights relating to the condition of refuge as is possible for a
situation which, unlike Convention refugee status itself, is intended to be
temporary.
In EXCOM Conclusion No. 22, Protection of Asylum Seekers in
Situations of Large Scale Influx, States agreed on how the Convention
was to apply in these circumstances. Article 33 refuge includes 'funda-
mental civil rights internationally recognized' and 'all necessary assistance'
with the 'basic necessities of life including food, shelter and basic sanitary
and health facilities ... '. However, beyond the mass influx the minimum
content of refuge is less clear.
The 1951 Convention text aims to create an international status and to
allocate rights for an internationally defined class of persons, refugees. Yet
the content of those rights as provided by States varies enormously,
indicating a need for authoritative interpretation.45 This is a problem for
the implementation of all human rights treaties as much as a problem of
implementing and interpreting the 1951 Convention.
The 1951 Convention designates certain rights for three main groups:
refugees; refugees lawfully on the territory; and refugees lawfully staying.46
All these terms are open to a variety of interpretations. The term 'lawfully
on the territory' must include legal arrivals such as students and visitors,
yet even this is not always followed in State practice.47 The overall scheme
of the 1951 Convention implies a hierarchy in access to rights from
Convention refugees to those newly arrived pending some decision. The
governments in the Standing Committee ofthe EXCOM agreed in similar
fashion that over time 'complementary protection' should take on the
content of 1951 Convention rights.48
As noted above, the Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties calls for
interpretation of the 1951 Convention in its current juridical context
alongside other human rights treaties. The UN human rights treaties
promise rights without discrimination to everyone on the territory. Yet
this promise itself remains to be realized.49 The human rights treaty bodies
44 See for example the report submitted by the Inter-Church Committee for Refugees to the UN
Human Rights Committee in 1990, and Brigit Lie, NilsJ. Lavik and Petter Laake, Traumatic Events and
Psychological Symptoms in a Non-clinical Rifugee Population in Norway, 14 JRS 276 (2001).
45 Hathaway and Dent, above n. 43.
46 Goodwin Gill, above n. 2 at 307.
47 Goodwin Gill, above n. 2 at 307-308.
48 Standing Committee 2000 above n. 8 at para. 25(f).
49 Clark with Niessen, above n. 31 at 260-272.
have their own particular interest in content rights because rights-based
refuge results in part from the application of the human rights treaties and
not just the application of the 1951 Convention.
Yet the human rights system has added some of its own complications.
While not binding, the 1988 UN Declaration on the Human Rights of
Individuals who are not Nationals of the Country in Which They Live
allowed non-citizens 'lawfully on the territory' the right to liberty of move-
ment and freedom to choose their residence (Art. 5.3). Non-citizens 'law-
fully residing' enjoy safe and healthy work conditions, the right to join
trade unions, the right to health protection, medical care, social services,
education. Distinguishing 'lawfully in the territory' from 'staying' is prac-
tically impossible in the range of real life situations presented by refugees
and asylum seekers. It is unfortunate that this initiative failed to set out a
clear package of minimum rights which apply to refugees and asylum
seekers who, as a matter offact, stay. As argued above, any division ofnon-
citizens into groups to enjoy or not enjoy rights or benefits must be
established in law, legitimate, necessary and proportionate in the range
ofparticular circumstances which arise. The later text of the 1990 Migrant
Worker Convention would allow those who are not documented to benefit
from certain rights, among them: working conditions (Art. 25); social
security (Art. 27); urgent medical care (Art. 28); education (Art. 30).50
However, to qualify, a person must have worked in the State so that any
promise of rights from the Migrant Worker Convention applies only to
refugees who can show they have worked.
3.1 Content Rights for 'Refugees'
The broadest category in the 1951 Convention is 'refugees'. Anyone who
has refuge gets at least these rights from the Convention: administrative
help (Art. 25); identity documentation (Art. 28); freedom ofreligion (Art. 4);
within certain limitations, property (Art. 13); artistic rights (Art. 14),
rationing (Art. 20); education (Art. 22); non-rifoulement (Art. 33); no
penalties for illegal entry (Art. 31); as well as: taxation, (Art. 29). These
rights should also be enjoyed, without discrimination, by any non refugees
in a substantially similar situation under human rights treaties. Never-
theless, these treaties are far less specific about the particular needs of those
enjoying forms of rights based refuge and authoritative interpretation
would be helpful.
3.2 Content Rights for 'Refugees Lawfully on the Territory'
According to the 1951 Convention in isolation, a refugee who is 'lawfully
in the territory' gets additional safeguards against expulsion under
50 The Convention on the Human Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their
Families, was adopted by the UN in 1990 and came into force I July 2003.
Article 32 of the 1951 Convention. This article prevents any expulsion,
with an exception on one of two grounds, national security and public
order, and then only after due process and a delay. 51 Such lawfully present
refugees also receive additional rights to travel documents (Art. 28); self
employment (Art. 18); freedom of movement (Art. 26). Articles 25-28
deserve notice because they are rare examples of clear-cut directions to
contracting States about their obligations. All refugees without documents
must be given help and identity papers. Refugees lawfully present are to
get travel documents as well.
The term 'lawfully in the territory' will have a specific meaning in an
international treaty.52 It must include at least what domestic law says so
that someone with a visa or some other status should qualifY. Yet it is not
simply a matter of what domestic law says. The notion that an interna-
tional perspective must be taken on the meaning of a human rights treaty
applies widely, for example in determining what is 'criminal'.53 A refugee
recognized as qualifying for Convention refugee status in a State party
would be lawfully present. It should also apply to a person with rights-
based refuge who also possesses some other document indicating the State
acknowledges presence, such as a valid work authorization.
The term 'lawfully within the territory' exists in CCPR Articles 12 and
13. Thus the HRC can give guidance on its meaning, but it has been very
cautious and there is little case law. However, it gave an 'objective-factual'
clarification that a person litigating the CCPR Article 12 right to freedom
of movement in Sweden was at least lawfully present for the purposes of
litigating the right.54 A similar approach was taken by the European Court
of Human Rights which ruled that an asylum seeker, who France argued
was being held in an international zone, was in fact detained in a desig-
nated part of a hotel in France.55
51 Art. 32 (1) The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save on
grounds of national security or public order. (2) The expulsion of such a refugee shall be only in
pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with due process of law. Except where compelling
reasons ofnational security otherwise require, the refugee shall be allowed to submit evidence to clear
himself, to appeal and be represented for the purpose before the competent authority or a person or
persons specially designated by the competent authority. (3) The Contracting States shall allow such a
refugee a reasonable period within which to seek legal admission into another country. The Contract-
ing States reserve the right to apply during that period such internal measures as they may deem
necessary.
52 Clark with Crepeau (1999), above n. 5 at 398.
53 'If the Contracting States were able at their discretion, by classifying an offence as regulatory
instead of criminal, to exclude the operation of the fundamental clauses of Articles 6 and 7, the
application of these provisions would be subordinated to their sovereign will. A latitude thus far might
lead to results incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention' (emphasis added),
European Court of Human Rights Oztiirk v. Federal Republic qfGmnany,Judgment 21 Feb. 1983, Ser.
A73 (1984), at 18.
54 Ismer Celepli v. Sweden, Communication No 456/1951, Views 2 Aug. 1994, UN Doe. CCPR/
C51/D/456/1991.
55 Amuur v. France, European Court of Human Rights, Judgement 25 June 1996, Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 1996-III (1996).
Using this very preliminary objective-factual approach, 'refugee law-
fully in the territory' should include a person in a refugee status determi-
nation procedure who is at least lawfully present for the purpose ofseeking
refugee status. Similarly, the person who is being considered under some
asylum sharing arrangement or other return arrangement related to
the 1951 Convention, must be considered 'lawfully present' at least for
the purposes of the application of that asylum sharing agreement or return
agreement. It is questionable, however, whether one can infer all 1951
Convention rights are thus available on the basis ofexisting jurisprudence.
It is likely that the refugee lawfully on the territory for the application of
an asylum sharing or return agreement is then also lawfully on the territory
for the benefits of the enhanced procedural safeguards against expulsion
which 1951 Convention Article 32 brings and for the benefit of the safe-
guard against expulsion in CCPR Article 13.56 An implication of this
interpretation is that once the person has an important right at issue, the
person is lawfully present until that matter has been addressed by the State
and at least the related safeguards of the 1951 Convention plus human
rights treaties have been applied.57 The Human Rights Committee could
provide General Comments on such matters and on the application of
Article 13 due process to asylum seekers in forms of expulsion, including
asylum sharing agreements. This would be an authoritative interpretation
of the CCPR.
On the objective-factual basis, lawfully in the territory also applies to a
person with rights based refuge with respect to whom deportation has not
been ordered or whose deportation has been suspended by the State. The
person must be deemed accepted by the State as temporarily residing
pending a change in circumstances which would allow deportation. Again,
this should have the effect of requiring the enhanced procedural safe-
guards against expulsion of at least 1951 Convention Article 32 and
CCPR Article 13, at least until refugee status is officially denied.
The Convention itself makes no distinction between dispersed indi-
vidual refugees and massive exoduses of refugees. A government which
has negotiated an arrangement for UNHCR to assist refugees on its
56 In contrast, a person who has been ordered deported and is nonetheless present, despite the
reasonable efforts of the authorities to deport, is not lawfully present. A person whose authorized
presence is no longer valid and whose continuing presence has not been made known to the authorities
is not lawfully present.
57 The Human Rights Committee is unclear about 'lawfully on the territory' under CCPR Article
13 in General Comment 15. However, in Kindler v. Canada (Communication No. 470/1991, Views UN
Doe. CCPR/C/48/D/470/ 1991) and again in Ahani v. Canada (Communication No. 1051/1992,
Views 25 May 2004, UN Doe. CCPR/C/80/D/I051/2002 (2004)) Article 13 was applicable to
persons being extradited for murder and on national security grounds, respectively. It appears that a
person is 'lawfully in the territory' when a substantive treaty right is at issue. This view is supported at
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights inJoseph v. Canada Report No. 27/93, Case 11.092,
Annual Report 1993 (1994).]oseph was underground at the time ofher complaint. Her right to seek and
obtain asylum was one of the rights at issue.
territory must be presumed to have recognized that they are 'refugees
lawfully in the territory' at least for the purpose of receiving the UNHCR
assistance. Refugees in camps raise questions about rights to freedom of
movement and liberty which will be explored in more detail below. In
European, African and the Inter-American regional human rights treaties,
refugees in camps benefit from protection against group expulsion.58
However, exactly what qualifies as a 'group' requires authoritative
interpretation. The safeguards of 1951 Convention Article 32 and
CCPR Article 13 should apply to any individual case by case returns.
3.3 Content Rights for 'Refugees Lawfully Staying'
Considering the 1951 Convention alone, refugees 'lawfully staying' benefit
from even more Convention rights: public relief like citizens (Art. 23);
labour rights and social security like citizens (Art. 24); work, like the best
for non-citizens (Art. 17); association and unionization like the best for
non-citizens (Art. 15); access to liberal professions (Art. 19); housing
(Art. 21). Like the term 'lawfully in the territory', 'lawfully staying' is not
solely a matter of domestic law. It is a matter of international interpreta-
tion which likely follows the objective-factual approach. Also, the principle
of non-discrimination can be applied to the restriction of several of these
rights and benefits to such a particular social group.
In the objective-factual and non-discrimination lens, it is difficult to see
a basis to automatically distinguish all persons in this group from all
persons in a group lawfully on the territory. 'Staying' implies that these
are refugees with a more secure basis for a finite period of residence.
Evidently, these rights would apply to those with the status of Convention
refugees. They should apply to all rights-based refuge 'refugees', including
Mandate refugees who are as a matter ofobjective fact 'staying'. A person
whose continued presence is known to the authorities and tolerated must
be viewed as lawfully staying even if 'staying' amounts to only a few days.
The Migrant Worker Convention, would allow irregular migrants who
qualified as migrant workers and were 'staying' on an objective-factual
basis to qualify for a majority of rights.
With some limitations on the right to work, the rights to work, educa-
tion, health and some family rights apply to everyone under State jurisdic-
tion allowed to remain.59 Some ambiguities which remained in the earlier
stud/o around (1) equal treatment before the courts for similar rights, (2)
fair trial and (3) due process in expulsion by fair trial or by CCPR Article
13 have been further clarified. In the case of Ahani the HRC found that
refugees being expelled on grounds ofnational security must receive equal
58 The collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited in regional human rights instruments; European
Convention, Protocol No. 4 Art. 4, American Convention, Art. 22.9, African Charter Art. 12.5.
59 Clark with Niessen, above n. 31 at 270-273.
60 Clark with Niessen, above n. 31 at 266-269.
benefit from CCPR Article 13. The Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights interpreted GAS Charter obligations as including access
to the courts to litigate rights and an appeal on the merits for a refused
asylum seeker.61 Although this was a specific report on Canadian refugee
status procedures, the interpretation ofGAS Charter rights is applicable in
the Americas.
The rights in temporary protection and complementary protection,
which States were willing to offer on a discretionary basis, were intended
by them to move to 1951 Convention rights as time progressed. This
analysis suggests that many of the 1951 Convention rights may be avail-
able but as a consequence of the parallel protection from human rights
treaties. However, there are some special circumstances which require
greater care - emergencies and liberty.
3.4 Towards a Core Content for Rights Based Refuge
Despite some clear cut clarifications62 many ambiguities about content
rights remain. True, human rights treaties like the CCPR have a built-in
mechanism to provide clarification - the treaty bodies. Yet so far, the
HRC has been cautious in finding State violations against asylum seeker
non-citizens in its case law. There is little directly relevant case law on
discrimination.
There is ample evidence that governments have not acknowledged all
these rights for individual dispersed refugees and that access to even
the 1951 Convention package of rights is mixed.63 It would be helpful for
the treaty committees and UNHCR to offer some General Comment
which clarified the content of rights based refuge much as the Sphere
Project has developed minimum standards for meeting social and eco-
nomic rights in a humanitarian emergencies.64 Also, on a practical note,
States find it easiest to administer packages of rights by a simple label or
status. In this regard, the use by States of a general temporary resident
status for the various circumstances which arise would be a helpful basis
r k f" . h 65lor a pac age 0 mInImUm ng ts.
61 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2000), above n. 40 at paras. 95-96, 104, 108.
62 A clear cut example is 1951 Convention Art. 16.2. It grants access to legal assistance for access to
the courts only to 'refugees habitually present'. There is little doubt that this would be discrimination
under the CCPR. Under the OAS Charter human rights there is no doubt. Legal assistance is
recognized as an important component of the right to fair trial for everyone and the application to
asylum seekers has been confirmed in jurisprudence. Thus the right is granted by the CCPR or OAS
Charter system rather than the 1951 Convention.
63 Hathaway and Dent above n. 43.
64 The Sphere Project was launched in 1997 by a group ofhumanitarian NGOs and the Red Cross
and Red Crescent movement. The project has developed several tools, the key one being a Handbook.
The Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response sets out for the first
time what people affected by disasters have a right to expect from humanitarian assistance. See the web
site at http://www.sphereproject.org/.
65 It is yet to be seen whether this potential will be realized for 'temporary resident' status
established by the [Canadian] Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2002.
Minimum standards were suggested for a 'large scale influx' in
EXCOM Conclusion No. 22, introduced above. This has considerable
persuasive interpretive power - but for the intended context. Minimum
standards for individual asylum seekers and the use of a status for them
were suggested by the Standing Committee for complementary protec-
tion.66 These are largely established rights under human rights treaties:67
Standing Committee view on Civil and Political Rights68
• protection from refoulement and expulsion (see CCPR Arts. 6, 7, 12,
13, 17,23, 24; CAT Art. 3)
• non discrimination - (see CCPR Art. 26)
• never to be subjected to torture or cruel inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment (see CCPR 7, CAT)
• freedom of movement without limits other than those necessary for
public health or public order (see CCPR Arts. 9, 12)
• access to courts and administrative authorities (see CCPR Arts. 14, 26)
Standing Committee views on Social and Economic Rights69
• adequate housing
• assistance or employment
• health care as needed
• primary and secondary education.
Clark and Niessen identified some important Social and Economic Rights: 70
• work (with some limits) or self-employment
• essential health care
• primary and secondary education
• family rights.
For a refugee to fully enjoy the rights promised requires a State to apply
together several human rights treaties as well as the 1951 Convention.
Some authoritative international interpretation of access to rights, and
hence a State's treaty obligations, would be helpful. Yet at present there
are only individual treaty bodies each with responsibilities towards a
particular treaty. In theory, the treaty bodies might collaborate to produce
joint General Comments on topics relating to asylum seekers, but, in
practice, that would be expecting too much from already overworked
members.
66 Standing Committee 2000, above n. 8 at paras. 14-17.
67 Clark with Crepeau (1999), above n. 5 at 409-410, and as discussed above.
68 Standing Committee 2000, above n. 8 at para. 16. The bracket references are mine, but see
para. 15 which refers to the Bill of Rights and regional human rights instruments.
69 Standing Committee (2000), above n. 8 at para. 17.
70 Clark with Niessen, above n. 31 at 270-273.
4. Limits and Emergencies and Rights Based Refuge
The 1951 Convention is not specific about what might be done in emer-
gencies and about general limits on rights. According to the text itself, the
right to refuge itself- protected by Articles 33, 32, 31 - may be limited
when national security, public order or serious criminality is at issue in
relation to a particular refugee. These terms are not defined. Article 9
allows for 'provisional measures' in time ofwar or other grave and excep-
tional circumstances 'which it [the State] considers essential to national
security pending' status determination and beyond. However, in the
ordinary meaning of the text, this is intended for a particular individual
refugee and is not intended to be generally applied to a population and,
therefore, cannot be considered a derogation clause. EXCOM Conclusion
No. 22, introduced above, establishes minimum standards for a large scale
influx - often related to an emergency. In the Macedonian situation
facing Kosovar refugees, the issue of a right of entry to safeguard life or
to prevent torture could be addressed by authoritative international
interpretation of human rights treaties. The related issue of whether one
might claim rights based refuge if one is under the jurisdiction of a State
official also requires interpretation.
The non-discrimination principle ofthe CCPR would be met with more
certainty by 'measures' which apply on the basis of objective criteria and
which do not apply on the basis of nationality or status of the person.
Distinctions between refugees as a social group and others should be
avoided. One of the few positive features about the wave of national
legislation to combat terrorism following the events of 11 September
2001 is that such legislation generally does not distinguish refugees from
non-citizens or citizens. Nonetheless, while derogation from discrimina-
tion on enumerated grounds is always prohibited, derogation from the
more nuanced aspects of CCPR Article 26 non-discrimination is possible
subject to the conditions set by CCPR Article 4.
Articles 32 and 33.2 provide a limited form of derogation within the
1951 Convention permitting expulsion or return on grounds of national
security and public order. However, the CCPR provisions for the suspen-
sion of rights, in Article 4, require a higher threshold for derogating from
CCPR rights involved refuge. 7 1 This can have the effect of raising the
threshold for expelling a refugee in an emergency. Yet there are situations
in which even this high threshold might be met.
71 'In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of which
is officially proclaimed, the States Parties ... may take measures derogating form their obligations ...
to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not
inconsistent with their obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on
grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.' CCPR, Art. 4.
The situation of applicants for refugee status changes once the persons
are in fact on State territory. It is quite possible that the situation which
actually unfolded in Macedonia in 1999 might permit derogation under
CCPR Article 4. Macedonia is a country with a small population of
roughly 78 per cent Macedonians and 22 per cent Albanian Muslims.
There was risk ofcivil conflict with sections of the Albanian community. In
addition, the location of the newly arrived refugees threatened to contam-
inate springs of water supplying the capital city of Skopje where a sig-
nificant fraction of the population resides. Thus, not one, but two of the
typical enumerated bases for limiting rights were involved. Arguably, the
CCPR Article 4 test might have been met. The significance of EXCOM
Conclusion No. 22 discussed above is uncertain. It calls on States to at least
admit refugees temporarily and it is clear from the context that the
situation of massive influx could amount to an emergency.
The situation is more complex because, as Morton Kjaerum noted,72
other rights are at issue. Protection from torture or from cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment can never be derogated. Macedonia
might have justified returning refugees on the ground of national security
under 1951 Convention Article 32 even when Article 33.2 is interpreted
using the high threshold from CCPR Article 4. Yet returning refugees in
the face of a foreseeable real risk of death or torture or cruel treatment
would have violated non-derogable CCPR and CAT rights.
Macedonia was in the impossible situation of having an obligation it
could not meet without help. Responsibility sharing and burden sharing
allowed outside assistance for the refugee population and it allowed a
number of refugees to be relocated in other countries. Convention Article
31.2 implies the possibility of the refugees going to another country - but
does not provide any means of implementation. The problem here is that
Macedonia had to 'ensure' (CCPR Art. 2.1) protection from torture and
cruel treatment to everyone on its territory. It could only do this with
assistance from outside. Macedonia has also to 'take the necessary legisla-
tive or other measures' (Art. 2.2) to ensure that protection. It is pure
pragmatism that if rights based refuge is to be viable in large scale
emergencies, some form of guarantee for the burden and responsibility
sharing must be in place.73 It is a conclusion reached by Hathaway and
Neve.74 The need for formalized burden-sharing was clear in 1981 in
72 Michael Barutciski and Astri Suhrke, 'Lessons from the Kosovo Refugee Crisis: Innovations in
Protection and Burden-sharing', 14 JRS 95, 2001. See also 'Responses' by Morten Kjaerum 14JRS
116 and by Terje Einarsen 14JRS 19, and 'Rejoinders' 127, 128.
73 Barutciski and Suhrke, above, n. 60.
7+ James C. Hathaway and R. Alexander Neve, Making International RdUgee Law Relevant Again:
A Proposal JOr Collectivized and Solution oriented Protection, 10 Harvard Human Rights Journal 115 at 118
(1997).
Conclusion No 22, but no mechanism has been developed over the
intervening decades.
4.1 LiInits on Liberty and FreedOlIl of Movelllent
The 1951 Convention does not contemplate detention as such, but in 1995
UNHCR issued Guidelines on the Detention of Asylum Seekers. The
Standing Committee subsequently asked that they be updated to include
human rights law. 75 The international legal status of the UNHCR Guide-
lines is uncertain. The vague 'precautions' of 1951 Convention Article 9
do not specifically include or exclude restrictions on movement but they
are limited to times of war or related exceptional circumstances, are to
be individually applied and must causally relate to national security.
Article 31 the 1951 Convention contemplates restrictions on movement
which apply only to refugees unlawfully in the territory by illegal entry or
presence. Restrictions are to be 'necessary'. They last until status is reg-
ularized or until the refugee obtains admission in another country. The
earlier discussion about the interpretation of 'lawfully in the territory'
raises questions about the application ofgeneral restrictions to movement.
The Article 9 term 'status' must be interpreted internationally so it need
not be limited to a formal status which a State assigns under domestic law,
although that would also qualify. From the international perspective of
UNHCR, Convention refugees have the status before a State recognizes it.
So any interpretation of restrictions of movement should not depend on
lack of formal domestic status. Also, the ordinary meaning of the Conven-
tion article puts the restrictions in the form ofconditions for release such as
those a State might apply when granting an individual bail.
CCPR Article 12 grants freedom of movement for all those lawfully in
the territory, with limits. It is distinct from liberty - implying a wider
mobility within the State and beyond. This essay has suggested that
applicants for refugee status qualify as 'lawfully in the territory' for the
purpose of refugee status determination. Iflawfully on the territory for any
one reason, they should enjoy freedom ofmovement. Any limits to CCPR
freedom must be established in law and necessary to protect national
security, public order, public health or morals, or the rights and freedoms
of others. The limits must be compatible with the CCPR. For example,
measures which resulted in refugees being detained more as a group than
other groups, such as citizens, could be discriminatory unless there was a
reasonable objective justification. Limits are exceptions and may not
become the rule. 76 Thus, the general restriction ofmovement ofindividual
75 Standing Committee, Progress Report on lriformal Consultations on the Provision qfInternational Protection to
all Who Need It, UN Doe. EC/48/SC/CRP.32, 1998, Section III, Para. 5.
76 Manfred Nowak, UN Convention on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, KehllStrasbourgl
Arlington: N.P Enge!, 1993,206-2217.
dispersed asylum seekers is prohibited. Similarly, the State which agrees
to allow UNHCR to assist a mass influx population has acknowledged
that the refugees are lawfully present - at least for the purpose of being
assisted by UNHCR. A status is imputed and any restriction on the
freedom of movement must be justified under CCPR Article 12 unless
this is derogated in a national emergency.
Some State practice is in part compatible with the above views. For
example, asylum seekers are detained in the USA until the domestic law
allows the person to begin the refugee status determination process. Then
the person is released as if the person is deemed lawfully present for the
purpose of status determination. However, this situation in the USA is
complicated by the related right to liberty which will be briefly explored.
CCPR Article 9 grants liberty, but allows restrictions. Deprivation of
liberty is presumed to involve arrest and detention. But there are proce-
dural safeguards on these restrictions. Deprivation of liberty cannot be
arbitrary. The basis must be in law. The person must be told the reasons, is
entitled to go to a court to seek release, and must be compensated for
unlawful arrest or detention.77 The European Convention on Human
Rights explicitly allows a non-citizen to be detained in order to
ensure expulsion.78 However, detention for the purpose of deportation
ceases to be lawful if the deportation cannot be carried out or is indefinite.
This is an area in which the treaty body can give an authoritative inter-
pretation of the State's obligations with respect to liberty as they relate to a
variety of situations facing asylum seekers and refugees.
5. Interpretation and Supervision of the Convention
UN human rights treaty bodies can already consider aspects of the 1951
Convention in terms of parallel rights in the relevant human rights
treaty.79 However, time and again, this essay has shown that authoritative
interpretation of the Convention in the context of other human rights
treaties would provide a basis for a clearer and more consistent rights
based refuge. The rC] may resolve disputes between States as provided in
the 1951 Convention and in doing so it may interpret the Convention and
could resolve ambiguities. According to its Charter, the UN has standing
before the IC]8o and the IC] is evidently competent to interpret the 1951
Convention in advisory opinions, if asked. However, a treaty committee
specifically for the 1951 Convention would usefully insulate the IC] from
77 Nowak, above n. 75 at 174-182.
78 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 5.1.f.
79 Clark with Crepeau (1999), above n. 5 at 109.
80 The UN Charter does not specify which organs of the UN have standing before the IC].
Presumably some preliminary advisory opinion from the IC] would have to be requested to resolve
the technical matter of which UN organ could have standing in what circumstances.
what might otherwise be an overwhelming number ofadvisory opinions. It
could also serve to stimulate or enable other jurisprudence relating to
refugee situations.
The later UN human rights treaties establish treaty bodies which are to
receive reports, may receive complaints from individuals and make public
their comments and views. To date, the supervision of the 1951 Conven-
tion has been largely discreet oversight by UNHCR with some UNHCR
positions on issues and some submissions to assist States develop refugee
related legislation. It would be helpful to have a more consistent applica-
tion of the same Convention by the many States Parties and to have a
more consistent package of rights for 'refugees' enjoying rights based
refuge.
UNHCR invited an expert paper from Walter Kalin about sU2ervising
the 1951 Convention for its Global Consultations during 2001.81 Kalin
offered an exposition of the various treaty monitoring or supervisory
mechanisms including the work of the human rights treaty committees.
He weighed the value ofUNHCR activity. UNHCR has access to statis-
tics. Widespread State practice allows UNHCR a presence on State
territory and the right to observe refugee related proceedings. He con-
cluded with a proposal for enhanced supervision by a more formal com-
ponent or group within the existing Standing Committee and EXCOM
procedures. That may well be helpful. However, Kalin underestimated the
importance for refugees and agencies which serve them of a form of
monitoring which offers transparency and published facts. He fails
to recognize the significance of authoritative interpretation which no
ad hoc group can bring but which the human rights treaty bodies can
provide. Surprisingly, he does not deal with the problem raised for super-
vision by the UNHCR and its EXCOM of the overlapping rights and
obligations from the human rights treaties. The UNHCR cannot supervise
a combination of 1951 Convention rights and other human rights.
Equally, of course, other treaty bodies cannot monitor the 1951 Conven-
tion over which they have no remit. Others have reflected more sharply on
the needs and possibilities for enhanced supervision by a body with the
powers of the human rights treaty bodies. The importance of a full range
of key functions like fact-finding and individual case law has been raised.
The difference between discreet silence and public accountability is emo-
tional and psychological as well as rational for refugees and for agencies
working with them. Justice demands that a person who has been wronged
has access to an authoritative body with power to confirm and publish the
facts, pronounce on whether a right has been violated or not, and to
provide redress. The same should be true if the person is a refugee.
81 Waiter Kalin, 'Supervising the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: Article 35
and Beyond', in Feller, Turk and Nicholson above, n. I, at 613-666.
The human rights treaty bodies are not without problems. In a recent
article, Saul Takahashi gives a good account of some pros and cons of the
typical UN treaty body as compared with the UNHCR for monitoring the
1951 Convention.82 Yet he also misses the point raised several times in this
essay. Authoritative interpretation is important. Judicial interpretation
informs the national legislator and the national courts in their own lan-
guage. It empowers NGOs for advocacy. UNHCR and the treaty commit-
tees play different but complementary roles. There should be no question of
either/ or. It is rather a question of both the UNHCR and a treaty com-
mittee. UNHCR promotes the implementation of the 1951 Convention as
one halfofits Statute mandate to protect refugees. It does so in an energetic
and effective manner. Its role is rather like that ofan ombudsman within a
State. UHNCR is principled, but pragmatic. It gets something to happen.
Yet its protection function must be reconciled with its other Statute
mandate - to find solutions to the problem ofrefugees with governments.
And the UNHCR must supervise the application of a Convention whose
application depends on other human rights treaties over which UNHCR
enjoys no similar authority. Equally, of course, human rights treaty bodies
can only deal with matters in their own treaties taking into account the
current juridical context in the wider international human rights law.
The fragility and lack of funding of the UN human rights treaty
committees are widely know. Yet their positive aspects become clear to
any NGO which works with them. The treaty committees can function in
a quasi judicial or court-like manner when they issue jurisprudence. This
gives a unique authoritative international interpretation of a treaty. In
their second function of examining a State on its periodic reports, they
draw on NGO and other public insights. In the examination process, they
raise both issues and pertinent specific structural legal problems about the
State. The entire exchange with a State is public. This is true when the
exchange is the examination of a report and when it is an exchange of
correspondence surrounding an individual complaint about an alleged
violation of a treaty right. There is a public record, public criticism and
suggestions. It is precisely this kind ofopenness about what is going on and
this kind of authoritative interpretation which is lacking for the 1951
Convention. At the same time, the discreet diplomatic work of UNHCR
is invaluable.
6. Conclusion
Non-rifoulement - Article 33 refuge - is the central plank of 1951 Con-
vention protection. The 1951 Convention refugee definition and its
82 Sau! Takahashi, Recourse to Human Rights Treaty Bodies fOr Monitoring if the RifUgee Convention,
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application may affect some 1 million refugees each year. But Article 33
refuge impacts all the 10-15 million persons of concern to the UNHCR.
The impact of the human rights treaties calls for re-examination. They
question earlier interpretations. It is now recognized that non-rifoulement has
been reinforced by refuge from other human rights treaties, like the
Convention against Torture. Nevertheless, their full impact has not been
grasped. The 1951 Convention is still discussed largely in isolation from
other human rights treaties. A notion of 'rights based refuge' better
captures this new reality.
The central issue of the entry into States of asylum seekers in mass
influxes can be addressed in part through the rights to life and liberty and
protection from torture at issue by human rights treaty bodies.
The Standing Committee of the EXCOM of the UNHCR indicated a
general willingness of the participating governments to accept temporary
protection for mass exoduses and complementary protection with content
rights, but subject to State discretion. When interpreted with human rights
treaties, rights based refuge accords much of temporary protection and
complementary protection as of right. The question of how to claim the
right remains. One way of pressing beyond State discretion is to seek
authoritative interpretations of these treaties as they apply to refugees.
The content rights of the rights based refuge is unclear beyond a
minimal list in the 1951 Convention. In principle, the human rights
treaties promise rights like health or education or access to courts without
discrimination. So far, they have delivered little content to refugees in
practice. Clarity about the content of rights relating to this refuge, about
limits and emergencies and about due process rights is needed.
The UN treaty committees could, now, decide to monitor the enjoy-
ment by refugees and asylum seekers of their rights and could, thus, in
effect, monitor many aspects of the implementation of the 1951 Conven-
tion all as part of their examinations of State periodic reports.83 Yet the
treaty bodies are restricted to interpretations of their respective treaties.
Ultimately, only the IC] can offer an authoritative international interpre-
tation of the 1951 Convention as it applies together with the various newer
human rights treaties. A treaty committee for the 1951 Convention,
mandated to work alongside the other UN human rights treaty commit-
tees, could make a useful contribution at facilitating joint or common
interpretations relevant for refugee situations. Such authoritative interpre-
tation would empower the protection promoting diplomacy of the
UNHCR.
The discretionary response which governments are so far willing to offer
in response to the need for temporary protection and complementary
protection is not enough in today's world. Humanitarian aid coupled
83 C1ark with Crepeau (1999), above n. 5 at 409-410.
with lack of control of global development are creating anger and frustra-
tion in poorer regions of the world. As the world stumbles towards
democracy and participation in domestic governments, aid and discretion
must give way to a sense ofjustice and rule oflaw at the international leveL
A rights based approach with binding commitments may be not only
desirable in principle, but also a necessary way of sustaining cooperation
in the global community.
